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No. 4

PURCHASE OF SHARES OF CORPORATION BY A DIRECTOR FROM A SHAREHOLDER.
T is generally laid down in the encyclopedias and text books, and
affirmed in many court opinions that "the doctrine that officers
and directors [of corporations] are trustees of the stockholders, applies only in respect to their acts relating to the property or
business of the corporation. It does not extend to their private
dealings with stockholders or others, though in such dealings they
take advantage of knowledge gained through their official position."' Much of this doctrine is based upon the language of Chief
Justice SHAW in Smith v. Hurd2 decided in 1847. He said: "There
is no legal privity, relation, or immediate connection between the
holders of shares in a bank, in their individual capacity on the one
side, and the directors of the bank on the other. The directors are
not the bailees, factors, agents, or trustees of such individual stockholders." This case was an action on the case at common law, by
an individual share holder against the directors for damages due
to various acts of negligence and malfeasance in office through a
series of years, in consequence of which the whole bank capital was
wasted and lost, and the plaintiff's shares, along with the others, became of no value. In sustaining a demurrer, the court gave the
following reasons for the rule above: (i) The corporation is a
distinct person in the law, in whom the whole stock and property
are vested. (2) The individual members have no right to intermeddle with the property, simply because they are not the legal
12X Am. & Eng. Enc. of Law. 2d Ed. 898; 10 Cyc. 796; z Morawetz, Priv. Corp.
P. 537 n. z, § 565; Taylor. Priv. Corp. 5th Ed. § 698; Cook, Priv. Corp. 6th Ed. § 320;
Elliott, Priv. Corp. 3d Ed. § 502; 3 Clark & Marshall, Priv. Corp. § 6x6, (b), (c);
.1-arshall, Priv. Corp. § 378; Purdy's Beach, Priv. Corp. H§ 356, 743; 3 Thompson, Priv.
Corp. Ist Ed. § 4034; Machen, Modem Law of Priv. Corp. § z637.
2 12 Met. (Mass.) 371, 46 Am. Dec. 69o.
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owners of it. (3) Injury done to the capital stock by impairing
its value is not in the first instance a damage to the stockholder.
(4) Shares do not constitute a legal estate and property, but a
qualified, equitable interest, and an injury done to the stock is not
an injury to such separate interest but to the Nhole body of stockholders in common.
The Supreme Court of the United States has recently been called
.upon to deal with that phase of- the relation between the corporate
officers and the individual shareholder arising out of the purchase
of the shares of the latter by one of the former, in the case of
Strong v. Repide,3 in which it overruled the decision of the Supreme
Cou'rt of the Philippine Islands.4 The case grew out of the sale
of the friar lands, about one-half of which were owned by the Philippine Sugar Estates Development Company, Limited." Repine
was the owner of 3o,4oo of the 42,o3o shares of this company, was
one of its five directors, and had been elected by the board as the
agent and administrator general of the company, and as such, without formal authority but after informal discussion at the directors'
meeting, represented the company in the iegotiations of the sale
of its lands to the United States. The plaintiff, Mrs. Strong, was
the owner of 8oo shares of the stock in this company, which were
in the possession of her agent, Jones, with power to sell, and who
sold them on October IO, I903, for $i6,ooo Mexican currency.
July 5, 1903, the United States offered to purchase all the friar
lands "at a price which would make plaintiff's Soo shares worth
$129,664 Mexican ctirrency; this offer was rejicted by Repide in
his capacity as majority shareholder without consulting other shareholders. In the latter part of October, 19o3, the government increased its offer to a price that made plaintiff's shares w*orth $81,504 Mexican currency. All the owners of the friar lands, except
the defendant, wished to accept this offer, but the defendant would
not until the others offered to pay his company $335,0oo and- the
government offered to exclude IOOO hectares of the company's land.
With these concessions, on December 21, 1903, defendant as attorney in fact for his company accepted the government's offer of
purchase. In September, i9o3, the defendant, while still holding
out for a higher price for the company's lands, took steps to purchase plaintiff's stock which he knew was in the possession of
$Strong v. Repide (19o9), 213 U. S. 419, 53 I. Ed. 853, 29 S. C. 521.
"Strong v. Repide (x9o7), 5 Off. Gaz. P. I. p. 72, reviewed 5 Mich. IT. R. (April,
2907),

5

P. 454.

The facts are partly taken from the report of the opinion of the Philippine Supreme Court.
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Jones, who had an office next door to him. Instead of seeing Jones,
he employed K (a relative of his by marriage), who in turn employed S, a broker, who had an office some distance away, to purchase the stock for him. K told S the stock was to be purchased
for a member of his wife's family; beyond this, S did not know
who wanted to buy; and Jones did not know, but if he had known
defendant was purchasing, he would not have sold at the price he
did. The articles of incorporation required a resolution of the
stockholders in general meeting for the purpose of selling more
than one hacienda of the company's land. No such meeting had
been called when the stock was bought by the defendant, and in allthe negotiations for the purchase of the stock not one word of the
facts affecting the value of the stocks was made known to plaintiff's agent by the defendant or his agent,--the real state of the negotiations for the sale of the land was not mentioned, nor that it
rested chiefly with the defendant to make the sale. During this time
however the subject of the sale of the friar lands was frequently discussed in the public press, and the plaintiff and her agent knew the
negotiations were going on and that defendant represented the company in the matter, but the state of the negotiations, or probabilities
of sale, or the influential position of the defendant in the matter were
not accurately known to, nor inquired into by, plaintiff's agent prior
to the sale. The Civil Code provides that "Consent given by deceit
shall be void,"-§ 1265; and "there is deceit when by words or insidious machinations on the part of one of the contracting parties
the other is induced to execute a contract which without them he
would not have made." The trial court found that the defendant
concealed from plaintiff's agent "facts affecting the value of the
stock which he in good faith was bound to reveal," and directed
the defendant to return the 8oo shares on repayment of the price,
or pay plaintiff $165,504 Mexican currency. The Philippine Supreme Court reversed this decision, on the ground that the code
required "some positive act of fraud," "which includes false promises, the abuse of confidence," and of which there is no evidence;
"it is absolutely erroneous to consider as consent obtained by deceit consent given upon insufficient information"; this was a "sale
in which consent was freely given, without any deceit, without any
information,-good, bad, or indifferent on the part of the purchaser," and "it was not preceded by insidious words or machinations
of any kind whatever." Judge JoHNsoN dissented, holding that the
corporate directors occupy a fiduciary relation to the shareholders
individually and collectively, and cannot be allowed to deal with the
corporate property so as to reap individual benefit at the ,expense
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of individual shareholders. The Supreme Court of the United
States reverses the decision of the Philippine Supreme Court, but
does not go so far as to affirm the view taken by Judge JOHNSON
in his dissenting opinion.
The late Mr. Justice PECKHAM rendered the opinion. He defines
"insidious machinations" as "a deceitful scheme or plot with an evil
design, or in other words, with a fraudulent purpose," which "need
not be by misrepresentations in words," but may be "by means of
concealing or omitting to state material facts with intent to deceive."
"This is the rule of the common law also; but in both cases it is
based upon the proposition that under all the circumstances of the
case, it was the duty of the party who obtained the consent, acting
in good faith, to have disclosed the facts which he concealed. In
such cases concealment is equivalent to misrepresentation."
"If it were conceded," says the court, "that the ordinary relations between directors and shareholders are not of such a fiduciary
nature as to make it the duty of the director to disclose to the shareholder general knowledge which he possesses regarding the value
of shares before he purchases, yet there are cases where by reason
of the special facts such duty does exist." The judge then states
these special facts: (i) defendant was a director; (2) owned
three-fourths of the stock; (3) was administrator general with
large powers; (4) was engaged in negotiations which finally led to
the sale of the land at a price which very greatly enhanced the value
of the stock; (5) was the chief negotiator; (6) was acting substantially as the agent of the shareholders by reason of his ownership
of shares and by acquiescence of other shareholders; (7) the negotiations were for the sale of the whole of the property; and (8) the
lands were the only valuable asset owned by the company. The
existence of these make "such a combination as rendered it the plain
Under these circumstances conduty of the defendant to speak."
cealing his own identity, the state of the negotiations, and their
probable result, and giving the check of a third person, were part
of the deceitful machinations, and "the law would indeed be impotent if the sale could not be set aside or the defendant cast in
damages for his fraud." The court does not review or discuss the
authorities upon any of the propositions involved, but cites two
7
cases, Stewart v. Harris0 and Oliver v. Oliver as illustrations of
"where by reason of special facts," a duty to give information exOStewart v. Harris (1904), 69 Kans. 498, 66 L. R. A. 26r, io$ Am. St. R. 178,
77 Pac. 277, 2 A. & E. Ann. Cas. 873.
'Oliver

v. Oliver (9o3),

ix8 Ga. 362, 45 S. E.

232.
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s
ists, and one case, Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds illustrating the
general rule that there is no such duty. These cases are referred
to hereafter.
A review of the pertinent authorities, in chronological order, and
their grouping together afterward, may be helpful in weighing the
result and reasons arrived at in Stromg v. Repide. The first case
to be considered is Walsham v. Stainton,9 decided in 1863, by the
English High Court of Chancery before Lords Justices KNIGHT

BRUCE and TURNER overruling Vice Chancellor Sir W. PAGE
WOOD.' 0 In this case H.__,. and J-S. were brothers and the Lon-

don agent and manager respectivelyof a corporation incorporated
in 1773. Through a series of years these parties defrauded the
company by selling large quantities of its goods at high prices, but
entering the sale upon the records much below the sum received,
and keeping the difference themselves. In i816 this amounted to
£120,000. These parties also placed their nephews in the accounting offices of the company, and required them to prepare fictitious
balance sheets to be placed before the directors which would not
show the true state of the company, in order that the stock might
be purchased by them at less than its real value. In 1813 - sold
shares to J. S., and in 1817 to H. S. at what was then supposed to
be the vaue of the shares, based upon the reports of the company,
but much below the real value, if the true condition had been known.
There was no concealment of the identity of the purchasers, or of
their official relation to the company. In the purchase there were
no false statements then made inducing the sale, though the price
was undoubtedly based upon the supposed condition due to the former false reports. This was not discovered until i86o, after all
the parties were dead,-38 years after the transactions. The executor of G sued the executor of J. S. to hold him liable to account
for the loss by the sale to H. S. Lord Justice TURNER stated the
case thus: "two confidential agents of the partnership, Joseph
Stainton and Henry Stainton, conspired together to obtain for themselves the shares of the parties in the concern, at an undervalue, by
keeping the accounts of the partnership fraudulently, so as to conceal from the partners the true value of the shares and it was by
means of this fraudulent conspiracy, these 4o shares were obtained by Henry Stainton at a price far below their real value." In
holding that J. S. and H. S. were jointly and severally liable, he said
further, "A more gross breach of duty on the part of an agent
STippecanoe County v. Reynolds (1873), 44 Ind. 509, 55 Am. Rep. 245.
De Gex, J. & S. 678 (66 Eng. Ch. R. 527).
'i
10 Walsham v. Stainton (1863), x Hem. & M. 322.
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towards his principal than is disclosed by this bill cannot well be
conceived, and it is not denied that there would be a remedy at law
against Joseph Stainton and his estate in respect to this breach of
duty," and "though J. S. got no benefit of the sale to H. S., yet he
stood in a fiduciary position toward the shareholderand was a party
to the fraud, and he as wvell as H.S. was liable to W. for the real value
of the shares." Here the defendants (i) defrauded the company,
(2) conceal this, (3) made false reports to directors, and (4) this
depressed the value of the shares to the damage of all the shareholders.

There had been a partial recovery

(f220,0oo)

by the

company from H. S. The whole case was treated as if there was
a direct relation of agency and trust existing between the directors
and individual shareholders, analogous to partnerships. The case
seems to be one of actual fraud, without reference to any fiduciary
relation.
Next is Carpenter v. Danforth,11 in the Supreme Court of New
York in 1868, SUTHRrAND, J. Here plaintiff was the administrator of the estate of G., who with the defendant had been an active
trustee in the management of the company, 12 which had declared
no dividends, but applied all its profits to the enlargement of its
business. When G. died he was the owner of 136 shares of the par
value of $50 each; the corporate property was subject to liens very
nearly equal to the par value of the shares. There were no market
quotations of the stock, and the plaintiff was wholly ignorant of
the company's affairs. The shares were sold to one W. but for
the use of the defendant then a director, in December, 1862, at $6o
per share. In May, 1863, extraordinary dividends (310 per cent)
were declared and paid from extraordinary profits made from the
extraordinary amount of work done-engraving the postage currency and the extraordinary price charged and in the end allowed
by the United States government. The company had made an offer
to plaintiff for his shares. The defendant told plaintiff he would
do better by him than the company, and that he was buying the stock
to get control of the company; and he spoke of what the company
was doing for the government and of the report of the Secretary of
the Treasury as bdaring on the continuance of the work. These
statements were true, but the postal currency engraving was not
specifically mentioned. When the sale of the shares was made all
the officers thought the continuance of the work on the postage
currency was precarious and might be terminated at any time, and
n Carpenter

v. Danforth, 52 Barb. (N. Y.) 58z.
12The facts are partly taken from xg Abb. Pr. 225.
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no bill was rendered to the government therefor before February
1863, and was not allowed and paid till May, 1863. Until then
there was no reasonable certainty as to what the company would be
paid for the work.
On behalf of the plaintiff it was contended that "from the relation of a director and a shareholder, undue influence on one side
and a corresponding trust and confidence on the other is to be presumed," anid that the sale must be declared void unless the defendant paid full price and disclosed every fact known to him, or which
with reasonable diligence he might have known, and unknown to the
plaintiff. The court says to this: There is a trust relation between
directors and shareholders, but it extends only to the management
of the general affairs of the corporation. The title to the property
is in the corporation. The directors are not trustees for the sale of
the stock of the corporation. They have no power as directors to
sell stock, except their own. Plaintiff's stock is not the subject of
trust between plaintiff and directors, and the trust relation had no
connection with plaintiff's stock except so far as good or bad management affects the value.
As to the duty to disclose material facts, the Court says: "It
will not do to make the principle generally applicable. As to stocks"
having a regularly quoted price or market value, parties generally
buy and sell with reference to this price rather than to the real value
founded on knowledge of the corporation. As to such would it do to
make the purchase of it by a director an exception, and say the parties dealt with reference to the supposed real condition of the corporation? Plainly not. But the duty from the mere trust relation must be the same where it exists, and my conclusion then is
there is here no trust relation and no constructive fraud."
Further the court says if there is liability it must be because
there is actual fraud,-either by false representation of a material
fact, or fraudulent concealment of a material fact; and upon a review of the facts as above stated, held there was neither false representations, nor fraudulent concealment; but as to the latter adds:
"I think then the question is, 'Did the defendant say or do anything
to divert or prevent plaintiff, and which did divert or prevent him,
from looking into or making inquiry into the condition of the company and its prospects for dividends especially as to the work for
the government on the postal currency?' I think the sale should be
set aside if this question be answered in the affirmative. I think
not." While the opinion in this case is to the effect that a director
is not a trustee for the individual shareholder so as to make it constructively fraudulent for him to purchase shares from the share-
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holder, yet it seems that even if the director had been held to be
such a trustee, the facts were such as to support the purchase anyhow, under the rule stated by PERRY that a "trustee may buy from
the cestui que trust provided there is a distinct and clear contract,
ascertained after a jealous and scrupulous examination of all the
circumstances and proof that the beneficiary intended the trustee to
buy, and there is a fair consideration, no fraud, no concealment, and
no advantage taken by the trustee of information acquired by him
in his character as such." 13
The next case is Board of Commissioners of Tippecanoe County
v. Reynolds, " decided by the Supreme Court of Indiana in 1873,
WoRmNi, J. The declaration alleged plaintiff was the owner of 570
shares of $5o each in a railroad company of which the defendant
was president and principal manager, and was, at the time of
the purchase of the stock for $25,650, or $45 per share, negotiating
a sale of the road, which was afterward consummated for a price
which made plaintiff's shares worth $342,000; and further that the

condition of the company had been concealed by failing to declare
dividends and by representations by the defendant that the stock
was not worth its face, and that depreciation of the stock had been
caused by losses, when he knew the accumulations of the company
were sufficient to pay all debts and losses and leave the stock IIOO
per cent above par. Upon a general denial by the defendants the
trial court found for him, and on a review of the evidence the majority opinion of the Supreme Court says: "We are satisfied that
no actual fraud was established. The defendant doubtless knew
much more about the condition of the affairs of the company and
the value of the stock both present and prospective than the plaintiff. He purchased the stock greatly below its real value, as subsequent events established, but he paid the market value at the
time, as far as it seems to have had a market value. It is not
shown that there was any special trust or confidence reposed in
the defendant by the plaintiff, which was violated by the former,
or of which he took advantage. * * * Was the defendant in
consequence of being a director and the president of the company,
a trustee of the plaintiff as a stockholder, whereby it became his
duty as a purchaser of the stock, to pay a fair and adequate price
for it, to take no advantage of the relation which he bore to the
company or the knowledge acquired thereby, and to disclose to the
plaintiff all the material facts within his knowledge, not known to
BReeder v. Meredith (19o6), 78 Ark. iiz, x5 Am. St. R. 22; Perry, Trusts, § r95;
Bispbam, Equity, § 237.
1HBoard &c. Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds (1873), 44 Ind. 5o9, iS Am. Rep. 245.
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the plaintiff affecting the value of the stock ?" After reviewing several cases including Smith v. Hurd, Carpenter v. Danforth, :Walsham v. Stainton, and many others, not directly in point, the court
"Stock in a corporation held by an individual is his own
says:
private property which he may sell or dispose of as he sees proper
and over which neither the corporation nor its officers have any
control. It is the subject of daily commerce, and is bought and sold
The
in the market like any other marketable commodity.
directors have no control or dominion over it whatever, or duty to
discharge in reference to its sale and transfer, unless it be, to see
that proper facilities are furnished for that purpose. As the property of the individual holder, he holds it as free from the dominion
and control of the directors as he does his lands or other property.
* * * Such being the nature of the interest of the stockholder
in his stock, and the directors having no control, power or dominion
over it, or duty to discharge in reference to it, beyond the duty
devolving upon them prudently to manage the affairs and property
of the corporation itself, it seems to us to be very clear that in the
purchase of stock by a director from the holder the relation of
trustee and cestui que trist does not exist between them."
DOWNEY, C. J., rendered a vigorous dissenting opinion to the effect
that the defendant was guilty of actual fraud, and if not, he occupied such a relation of trust and confidence toward the plaintiff as
under the circumstances made him guilty of constructive fraud.
Mr.TAYLOR says of this case: "The transaction which in this case
was allowed to stand seems to the writer to have been eminently
unfair, and indeed a rule-for which this decision is certainly
authority-that directors in their dealings with shareholders are
entitled to take advantage of their knowledge of facts not known
to the latter, but which the directors are acquainted with by reason
of.their official position, seems of questionable propriety,"'15 Judge
THOTMPSON also says of this case, "This holding is believed to be
unsound, and the dissenting opinion of Chief Justice DOWNEY
is to be preferred."' 16
Fisher v. Budlong,'7 decided by the Supreme Court of Rhode
Island in 1873, is a case in which there was a special agency between the seller and purchaser of the shares. The plaintiff had
upon the recommendation of the secretary of the company bought
shares in an insurance company at $54 per share. A few days
later when the plaintiff told the defendant (who was president of
Private Corporations, 5th Ed. § 698, note r.
Private Corporations, ist Ed. VoL 3, § 4034.
17 Fisher v. Budlong, zo R. I. s25.
18 Thompson,
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the company) of the purchase the defendant said they were worth
only about $35, as the company had had many losses, and advised
plaintiff to sell, and said he might hear of a buyer. A short time
afterward the defendant told plaintiff he had a buyer at $48 per
share, and advised him to sell. Plaintiff said he confided in the
defendant and would do so on his representations; they immediately
had the shares transferred to a third party, but payment was made
by the check of the defendant to whom plaintiff paid a commission
for selling the shares. The shares were soon afterward transferred
to the defendant. When the company was wound up within two
years afterward, the shares were found to be worth about $9o
each. It was not fully shown that the defendant had misrepresent-.
The 6ourt however held the
ed the condition of the company.
defendant liable because the defendant professed to be aiding the
plaintiff in selling his stock and getting a good price for it, and was
in making a sale of plaintiff's shares.
really acting as his agent 18
In Deaderickv. Wilson, the Supreme Court of Tennessee, in 1874,
by FRnEEAN, J., upon demurrer to a declaration, by shareholders
in a railroad company against the directors charging them both
,officially and individually with conceiving and executing a scheme
of speculating in the stock to the damage of the owners of it, and
to the profit of themselves, that they availed themselves of their
superior knowledge, influence and power, and other advantages incident to their positions as such officers and, procured the stockholders to transfer to them their shares of stock at prices far below
the prices that their superior information enabled them to foresee
said shares would command; said: The legal proposition underlying the charge made is "that the officers are trustees for the individual owners of stock and as such cannot be allowed to make a
profit out of their trust. * * * It is not in the line of their duty
to sell the shares owned by the shareholders. Nor can it be said that
such officers may not as individuals purchase and hold stock in the
corporation of which they are members. * * * After all, the
simple question involved is whether the officers and directors are
free to purchase stock from a shareholder in the corporation on
the same terms as others. To this there can be but one answer,
that is, they may, unless prohibited by legislative restriction."
The court relies on Smith v. Hurd and Tippecanoe Co. v. Reynolds,
supra, and sustains the demurrer.
In Grant v. Atrill 9 (1882), WiEmIx, D. J., ruled on a demurrer
3

fDeaderick v. Wilson (1874), 67 Tenn. (8 Baxt.) zo8.
"Grant v. Attrill, ix Fed. 469.
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to a declaration alleging: that the defendants, who held a majority
of the stock on which only 5o cents per share of $ioo had been
paid,elected defendant and others who acted with him as directors,
and who made an assessment on the stock and threatened to make
others rapidly for the purposes of the company, which were not in
fact necessary, and which they did not intend to enforce if they
could purchase the rest of the stock; that the plaintiff believing the
threatened assessments would be made and enforced, and the money
misapplied, sold his shares to defendants at $2.50 per share; that
the assessments were not made nor 'enforced; and that the stock
turned out to be of great value,--did not stat6 a cause of action.
The court says defendant does not appear to have misrepresented or
concealed any material fact, relative to the corporate franchises or
property. What was represented or withheld related to the policy
of management and plaintiff seems to have preferred to sell rather
than risk this.
In Gillette v. Bowen 0 (1885), Judge BRZWER said "that trust relations to the corporation do not, as to the stockholders, create trust
relations inter sese." Here plaintiff was one of four directors who
had transferred to T. one of the directors, $5oo,ooo of the mining
corporation stock, upon his promise to procure a stamp mill for the
company. T. failed to do this, but Bowen, another director, did
procure a stamp mill, and the $500,000 issued to T. was used to pay
for it; later the vendor of the mill sold back part of this stock to
Bowen and the other defendant directors, at a profit to themselves,
for which plaihtiff claimed they were liable to him. Judge BREWER
says: "There being no confidential relations between Bowen and the
complainant it devolves upon complainant to prove that Bowen's conduct was wrongful, and not upon Bowen to prove that it was rightful.
* * * The wrong charged upon defendant Bowen is not proved
and judgment should be rendered for him."
In Perry v. Pearsoll 21 (18go), Perry was the owner of a large part
of the stock in a lumber company of which he and Pearson were both
directors. The company was not prosperous, and in 1884, Perry sold
all his stock to Pearson for $375,oo. Two years later, the price of
lumber had greatly increased, and the company sold out all its stock
to third parties, at a profit of $135,oo. Perry then sued Pearson for
his share of these profits,--on the ground that a confidential relation
existed between him and Pearson as directors. The court said "He
made the sale with his eyes open. * * * No misrepresentations
.0Gillette v. Bowen, 23 Fed. 625.
21Perry v. Pearson, 135 Ii. 21&
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were made to him. He was as well acquainted with the value of
what he was selling as were those who purchased from him. * * *
If it be admitted that there were confidential relations between the
parties we see nothing in the evidence to convince us there was any
abuse of such relations."
Crowell v. Jackson2 2 in the Court of Errors and Appeals of New
Jersey in 1891 ruled, by-Chancellor McGILL, that "In purchase or
sale if there be no designed misrepresentation by words or deeds and
no active intentional concealment, and no intentional silence where
there is a duty to speak, an action for deceit will not lie. A director
or treasurer of a corporation is not because of his office, in duty
bound to disclose to an individual stockholder before purchasing
his stock, that which he may know as to the real condition of the
corporation affecting the value of that stock. He is to some extent
trustee for the stockholders as a body, but does not sustain that
relation to individual stockholders with respect to their several holdings over which he has no control" This case was an action for
deceit by plaintiff against the cdefendant who was a director and
treasurer of a printing company which had made a favorable sale
of all its property of which the defendant knew and plaintiff did
not know, and knew no facts to put him on inquiry. Knowing this
the defendant bought the shares at a price for which the plaintiff
in his ignorance was willing to sell but which was much below their
real value.
In 1892 Mr. Justice STURRtTT, of the SupremeCourt of Pennsylvania, in Krurnbhaar v. GriffithS, 23 held there was no liability on
the part of the defendant to the plaintiff on these facts: the plaintiff
was the owner, February i, i89o, of twenty-five shares in a warehousing company. The market value of the shares was then $42.5o
per share; an offer had then been made by the company to lease its
piers to the Reading railroad company, which had declined to accept
the offer. Later the railroad offered to lease one pier at $io,ooo
per year with an option to rent all the piers at $6,ooo per year for
each pier; this was accepted and a lease executed, and confirmed by
the shareholders February 3. Early in this month plaintiff received
a note from a broker offering to sell his stock for him; he called at
the office of the company February 8, and had an interview with the
defendant who had been elected secretary February 3, and who
showed plaintiff the annual report made February 3; on February
ii, the defendant wrote plaintiff telling him he could find a pur2
2

Crowell v. Jackson, 53 N. J. L. (24 Vroom) 656.
Krumbhaar v. Griffiths, xis Pa. St. 223.
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chaser for him. Plaintiff called the next day, and defendant offered
him $50 per share; plaintiff asked $6o per share, but finally gave
defendant an option at $55 per share, which defendant exercised
later in the day, and the sale was completed the next day, February
13. February 17, the railroad company exercised its option to lease
all the piers, and when this became known in March, the stock rose to
$125 per share. Before February 17, it was not supposed the railroad
would exercise its option, and the lease was not considered favorable. The plaintiff claimed that he asked the defendant if he knew
of anything pending likely to increase the value of the shares, and
the defendant answered he did not, and the court found this was
true. The court said: "It seems there is no special confidential
or fiduciary relation between an officer of a corporation and a person from whom such officer purchases the stock of the corporation."
In Haarstick v. FoX, 24 (1893), plaintiff was the president of a
St. Louis transportation company in which M. (living in New
York) was the owner of 1414 shares, which had belonged to her
husband who died in 1888. In December 1889 she wrote plaintiff
asking him what the market value of the shares was; he answered
he thought he could sell them -at $65 or $7 o , but it probably would
take 30 or 6o days to place so large a block of stock. January 27,
M wrote "Think stock is worth more; what is the very best you can
do?" Plaintiff answered "We are having all rail competition, and I
think the figure mentioned is about as much as you can realize."
February IO, M wrote saying she had concluded to sell for
$ioo,ooo; plaintiff answered February I9, telling of losses amounting to $75,ooo, and said "If you will sell the 1414 shares for $92,500,
I will undertake to dispose of them- in 6o days"; February 25 M.
wrote accepting the offer, but said she would not give possession for
40 days. Plaintiff answered that this was satisfactory, mailing the
letter on March i, but which did not reach M. until March 4, at
Salt Lake City, where she had gone, was ill and died March 5,after
being unconscious for 24 hours, and never knew the letter had been
received. M.'s administrator refused to deliver the stock to plaintiff, it having a value April IO, of $IO4,OOO. Plaintiff sued; the
defense was that a confidential relation existed between plaintiff and
M. which raised a presumption of fraud which can be rebutted only
by proof that plaintiff had fully disclosed to M. all his information
concerning the company prior to making the contract. The court
held not so, and gave judgment for plaintiff, saying "So long as he
-'Haarstick v. Fox, 9 Utah zzo.
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remains silent and does not actively mislead the person with whom
he deals the transaction cannot be set aside for fraud."
In Ritchie v. McMulen 25 (897), Judge TAvr held: "If a stockholder pledge his stock as collateral, with directors of the corporation, and the latter enter into a conspiracy to depreciate the price of
the stock by using their power as directors, for the purpose of buying it in for less than its value, this. is a wrong not against the corporation only, but against the pledgor for which there is a direct
If such pledgee use his position as
liability to him. * * *
director and his vote as stockholder intentionally to depreciate the
stock with the dishonest purpose of acquiring ownership at forced
sale, this is a direct injury to his pledgor, and he cannot avoid direct
liability to his pledgor for it, by pleading that the means by which he
accomplished this wrong, and violated his duty as pledgee involved
an injury to the corporation for which it may also recover damages."
The judge relies on Walsham v. Stainton, above.
In Brown v. DeYoung,2 6 decided by the Illinois Supreme Court
in 1897, H. and M. owned 4,160 of 5,ooo shares in a corporation
of which M. was president. H. not agreeing with M. in the policy
of management transferred his shares to the defendant who was
to induce M. to adopt a policy of management suitable to H. and
for which defendant was to receive $i,ooo per year, and on demand
retransfer the shares to H. The defendant became secretary and
as such was entitled to $5oo salary. Soon afterward defendant, in
collusion with M. and with the knowledge of H., but without the
knowledge of other shareholders increased their salaries from $500
each to $1,500, then to $2,5oo, and then to $3,5oo. After this H.
-demanded the return of his stock, and defendant returned it. H.
then sued defendant and M. for the amounts they wrongfully paid
themselves, making the corporation a party, and allowing the innocent shareholders to join as parties plaintiff. The corporation disclaimed any interest in the sum, and it was held H. could not recover
because he knew of the transaction, but that the innocent shareholders should recover individually as if the fund to be recovered
should be declared as a dividend upon the stock in proportion to
their holdings and the defendant be allowed to keep the balance.
In Mulvane v. O'Brien,2 t'in the Supreme Court of Kansas, in 1897,
DOSTZR,' C. J., held Mulvane was liable to O'Brien upon these facts:
Mulvane was president and O'Brien secretary of a corporation, with
equal opportunities to know the conditions of the corporation.
5Ritchie v. McMullen, 79 Fed. 522, 25 C. C. A. 5o.
20 Brown. v. De Young, z67 Iil. 549.

27Mulvane v. O'Brien, 58 Kans. 463, 49 Pac. 6o7.
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While O'Brien was ill and at Hot Springs, Arkansas, MIulvane
wrote O'Brien proposing to effect a sale of all the corporate stock
at par, and asked O'Brien to transfer his shares in blank to him, to
O'Brien did this.
be delivered in case the sale went through.
Mulvane was at the time negotiating for a sale at much above par,
and effected a sale for $I5OooO more than par. He concealed
this from O'Brien and settled with him at par. Held that Mulvane
was liable, on the ground that he was a special agent of O'Brien
to effect the sale of the stock, and must account to him for all the
received.
In Rafferty v. Donnelly,2 8 (19oo) in the supreme court of Pennsylvania, the plaintiff charged the defendant, directors with fraudulently voting themselves $5o,ooo back salaries as officers of a corporation, fraudulently_ concealing this fact, and through an agent
acting for defendants, inducing plaintiff to sell his stock to them
for a price based upon the, existing assets, debts, and liabilities,
and without the plaintiff's knowledge that they had wrongfully
The court by Mr. Justice
paid themselves such back salaries.
BROWN said: "If they did directly wrong him in his estate by
fraudulently impairing its value, and, by their concealment of their
misconduct, he parted with his property for less than it was really
worth, he would upon proper averments and proofs be entitled to
relief." The master however found that plaintiff failed to prove
his averments. The court further said that "if he sold with knowledge, his bill was properly dismissed. At no time did the money
belong to plaintiff, and if defendants improperly took it, plaintiff
though a stockholder could not have sued to recover hls share, but
only by a proper suit to compel its return to the treasury, where
it would have become assets, and preserved the real value of his
stock."
In Hume v. Steele,29 (19oo) the defendant, who was engaged
in the management of the corporation, in which plaintiff owned
shares, made false accounts against the company ard other false
statements of its financial condition to the plaintiff, whereby he,
believing them to be true, was induced to sell his shares to him
at much less than their real value, was held liable on the ground of
actual fraud.
In the English case of Percival v. Wright,30 (i9o2), in the
Chancery Division, the plaintiff sued to set aside a sale of his shares
to the defendants who were directors of a coal company, with
23Rafferty v. Donnelly, 197 Pa. St. 423.
" Hume v. Steele (Tex. Cir. App.), 59 S. W. 8z2.
3*Percival v. wright, [9o], L.. R. 2 Ch. 421.
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power to manage, but not to sell all the property without a special
resolution of the company. October 8, 190o, the plaintiff wrote
the secretary asking if he knew- of any one disposed to purchase
shares; the secretary answered, asking price; plaintiff replied £12 5s
per share; this was based upon a valuation made by independent
valuers, andobtained by P. One of the defendants replied saying
the letter to the secretary had been handed to him, and he would
take the shares at the price named £12 5s. In the meantime plaintiff's solicitors had taken a new valuation, and plaintiff wrote he
would take £12 IOS. October 22, defendant wrote accepting this
and directing that 85 shares be transferred to him, and 84 shares
to each of the other directors. This was done. The shares had
no market price, and were not quoted on the stock exchange.
Later, plaintiff learned that at the time of these transactions, the
directors were negotiating for the sale of all the corporate property
at a price that would make the shares worth much more than
£12 ic's. The directors did not inform plaintiff of these facts.
The sale of the property however did not go through, yet plaintiff
sued to set aside the sale, and his attorney argued that as soon
as a proposition for sale of all the property was taken up, the directors were trustees for the shareholders, but admitted they would
not be concerning matters arising in the management such as a
large profit, discovery of a new mine, or prospect of an extra
dividend, etc. He also argued "that a share was like a share in
a partnership, and in equity the property belongs to the shareholders, and directors as trustees cannot purchase the interest of the
Incorporation
beneficiary without giving him full information.
shareholders
the
that
principle
equitable
cannot affect this broad
Mr. Justice
partners."
as
position
same
the
in
are
inter se
SWINEN E-ADY, however held otherwise,--"directors are trustees
of the company's property, as -an entity distinct from shareholders,"
and said "I do not adopt the view that the position of the shareholders inter se was the same as that of partners or shareholders in
an unincorporated company." Walsham v. Stainton, above, was
not referred to either in the argument or in the opinion.
In Walsh v. Goulden,1 (I9o2), the facts were: The defendants,
directors of a gas company secured options from all the shareholders to purchase their stock at double the par value, having at the
time an option with another company to sell the entire stock and
property for the same price, and of which plaintiff was aware
when he gave his option. Later, the directors perfected the sale
32Walsh v. Goulden, 130 Mich. 53!.

DIRECTOR'S PURCHASE OF SHAREHOLDER'S SHARES 283
for this price and an additional sum to pay the debts of the company. Still later, but before the sale was completed, the purchasing
company agreed to give each of the defendants $5,0oo in bonds
and $1,200 in stock of the purchasing company, if they would beJudge
come directors thereof, and to which they consented.
GRANT of the Supreme Court of Michigan held that the defendants,
not having made false representations or secret agreements by which
they were to profit at the expense of the shareholders, were not
liable to the plaintiff for any stock or bonds so received. Directors
stand in a fiduciary relation to the corporation itself, but not to the
stockholders individually when dealing with them for the purchase
or sale of stock; and some actual misrepresentation is necessary to
constitute fraud.
In 1903, the Supreme Court of Washington, in the case of
32
O'Neile v. Ternes, held there was no liability on the following
facts: Plaintiff was the owner of IOO shares of stock in a transfer
company, by a specific legacy under a will of which the defendant
was executor, and at the same time president and general manager
of the company; the shares,-par value $2o,-were appraised at
Plaintiff wrote defendant that she had been
$4.75 per share.
offered $iooo for the shares, and if he wanted them at that price
he could have them. Defendant immediately accepted the offer,
paid the price and had the shares transferred to his wife. There
was no evidence that the shares were worth more at the time of
purchase. Plaintiff testified that she did not rely on the defendant's statements, that she did not believe what he had told her, that
she knew that the stock was worth more, and she sold it because she'
Afterward, , plaintiff was
wanted to get something out of it.
made an effort to rethen
she
offered $1,500 for the stock, and
and interest, and de$I,OOO
the
back
pudiate the sale, tendering
confidence and violaof
"betrayal
charging
retransfer,
a
manding
tion of trust obligations." The court by ANDERS, J., held that no
trust relation arising out of his office existed between defendant
and plaintiff.
33
In Oliver v. Oliver, (19o3), the Supreme Court of Georgia
easily found a liability on the part of the defendant, who, while
president of a cottonseed oil company sought and obtained options
from the shareholders at $iio per share, saying there was no longer
profit in the business, more mills were being built, and he wanted
to be in a position to sell out, if opportunity offered, to the benefit
O'Neile v. Ternes, 32 Wash. 528.
2 Oliver v. Oliver, i18 Ga. 362.
12
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of all. At the end of the year the defendant reported the company
had lost money and omitted certain assets from the statement of the
company, and no dividend was declared; under these circumstances
the plaintiffs, believing the options were to sell for not less than
$ IO per share, and more for the benefit of all if more could be obtained, allowed the options to continue, and the defendant was
thus constituted agent for this purpose; he then had entered into
negotiations for the sale of the shares, completed in August, at the
price of $185 per share; he borrowed money, paid the shareholders
$i1O per share, and took a transfer to himself, keeping the extra
$75 per share after the sale was completed, and repaying the money
The court, by LAMAR, J., in holding the defendant
borrowed.
liable, after saying that all authorities agreed that he was a trustee
for the company adds: "But the fact that he is a trustee for all
is not to be perverted into holding he is under no obligations to
each. * * * That he is primarily trustee for the corporation is not
intended to make the artificial entity a fetich to be worshipped in
the sacrifice of those who in tlje last analysis, are the real parties
in interest. No process of reasoning and no amount of argument
can destrby the fact that the director is in a most important and
legitimate sense, trustee for the stockholder." If the market or
contract price differs from the book value there is no duty to point
thaf out, for in theory this information is equally accessible to both.
If the officer has information his duty to the company requires him
to keep secret, this overrides his duty to disclose to the shareholder,-but this does not permit him to use it to his own advantage and to the disadvantage of the shareholder, it only prevents
him from then dealing with the shareholder. If he has information
which affects the selling price, and which can be disclosed to the
-shareholder without detriment to the company "the director before
he buys is bound to make a full disclosure. In a certain sense the
information is a quasi-asset of the company, and the shareholder
is as much entitled to the advantage of that sort of an 'asset as to
afly other regularly entered on the list of the company's holdings.
If the officer should purposely conceal from a stockholder* information as to the existence of valuable property belonging to the conpan , and take advantage of this concealment the sale would necessarily be set aside. The same result would logically follow where
the fact giving value to the stock was of a character which could
not formally be entered on the records. When the director obtains
the information giving adfed value to the stock by virtue of his
official position, he holds the information in trust for the benefit
of those who placed him where this knowledge was obtained, in
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the well founded expectation that the same should be used, first
for the company, and ultimately for those who were the real
owners of the company. The director cannot deal on this information to the prejudice of the artificial being called the corporation,
nor on any sound principle can he be permitted to act differently
towards those. who are not artificially but actually interested
* * * The shares are but the paper evidence of the interest which
the stockholder has in the property under the control of the director.
In their sale the stockholder disposes not only of the lithographed
or engraved scrip but of his holdings in property. And when the
director deals with a stockholder for the purchase of shares he is
not buying paper but in effect buying an undivided and substantial
interest in property which has been committed to the director's care,
custody and control. * * To say that a director who has been placed
where he may himself raise or depress the value of the stock or
in a position where he first knows of facts which may produce
that result, may take advantage thereof, and buy from or sell to
one whom he is directly representing, without full disclosure and
putting the stockholder on an equality of knowledge of these facts,
would offer a premium for faithless silence, and give a reward for
the suppression of truth. It would sanction concealment by one
who is bound to speak and permit him to take advantage of his own
wrong,--a thing abhorrent to a court of conscience."
4
So, too, in Morrison v. Snow" (i9o3), a liability was easily
found by the Supreme Court of Utah. Here plaintiff agreed to deed
to a mining company, formed by the defendant, mining claims for
300,000 shares, half to be issued to plaintiff and half to the defendant. This was done. A mining engineer reported favorably upon
the claims, saying some of the ore was worth $296 per ton. The
defendant requested that this report be not communicated to plaintiff, and after he had sold some of his shares at two cents a share,
told plaintiff that he could not give the stock away, that the ore
would not pay to ship, that he had advanced $2,ooo for running
expenses, and that an assessment on the stock would be necessary,
and offered plaintiff $500 for i45,ooo shares, saying he wished
some one would make him such an offer. The statements of the
defendant were false and known to him to be so. Plaintiff accepted the offer, and afterward learned of the falsity of the statements, and sued to. rescind. Held, he was entitled to such relief.
Here there was positive and intentional misrepreseritation of material facts, and the case comes within the ordinary rule of actual
"Morrison

v. Snow, 26 Utah 247.
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fraud, and does not depend upon any special confidential relation.
In Stewart v. Harrisa5 (i9o4), the defendant took hold of the
affairs of a bank in 1893, when it was in a deplorable condition,
having many notes due that had been charged off as worthless, and
much land that was considered worthless, was carried on the books
Under defendant's management the
at a nominal valuation only.
bank became prosperous; the supposed worthless notes were paid,
and the lands became valuable, but these facts were kept so as not
to appear in the statement of assets, and were not referred to in
the published reports of the bank. Plaintiff owned shares, and in.quired of defendant if dividends would be paid; the defendant said
no, that the.bank was in good condition, and the policy was to
strengthen it; he also told the plaintiff of the bad condition when
he took hold of it, and of the large amount of property then charged
off, but said nothing about the property having since become valuable; he offered plaintiff $I,ooo for his shares, later $i,4oo, and
later purchased them'for $2,ooo, when they were then worth $4,200,
and still later a dividend of 12o per cent was paid. The defendant
was held liable, and the Supreme Court, by ATKINSON, J., approved
a: charge by the lower court that directors stand in the relation
of trustees to all stockholders not engaged in the management, and
must give any shareholder from whom he purchases shares all
pertinent information possessed by him affecting their value, before
purchasing.
In Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 8 (19o5), the defendant, president of a prosperous corporation, wrote the plaintiff in California
stating the majority of the share holders had closed a deal for
turning over all the property and shares of the corporation to New
York parties, and asking plaintiff to forward his 72 shares with
a sight draft for $14,4oo; instead of doing this however, plaintiff
sent his agent to- make an investigation; this agent found the net
profits had averaged 30 per cent for several years, that the surplus
was $2o,ooo, and that the New York offer was over $230 per
share; defendant refused to give definite information, falsely denied the existence of a book (which however was not shown to
contain pertinent information), but did not refuse or prevent an
inspection of the books. Upon this report of the agent, and the
repeated declaration by the defendant that the majority had determined to .sell, plaintiff sold his shares to defendant at $18,ooo, when
sStewart v. Hartis, 69 Kans. 498, 77 PaC. 277, xoS Am. St. R. z7.8, 66 I.. t. A.
a61. See the later case of Stewart v. Smith (1o95). 7a Kans. 77, involving the same
fact-% where the method of valuing the shares and of measuring the damage is con'idered.
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they were really worth $32,ooo. The court held that the director
is not a trustee for the shareholder, and besides in this case the
plaintiff relied upon the independent investigation of his own agent,
instead of the statements of the defendant.
In Boulden v. Stilwell 7 (19o5), where the president (S) and
general manager (L) conspired to secure control of the corporation
by inducing the plaintiff (B), the secretary and treasurer of the
company, to sell his shares to (L), by S telling B he was going to
sell his stock to L, that the company was going to fall down, and
later that he had conditionally sold to L; and S and L had several
times pretended to quarrel in the presence of B; and L told B he
had agreed to buy S's stock, and would then control the company,
and B would be deprived of his salary. Relying on these, B sold
his shares to L, and a few days later S and L sold out to a third
party for a sum much greater than the price paid to B, who sued
for deceit. The court held the statements that the company was going
to fail, that he was going to sell, and plaintiff would be discharged
were not statements as to existing facts but declarations as to
future contingent events, and that the other statements were not such
as a prudent person would rely on, and further "where both parties
have equal means of knowing the value of the thing sold a false
statement by one relating to its value is not actionable fraud." The
trust relation is not discussed.
8 (I9o7), Baird had in I9oi put his shares
In Baird v. Grannis,3
in the hands of brokers in St. Louis
company
land
in a Louisiana
to sell at $125 per share. The company then had a contract with
a .coal company to sell its lumber at $i.5o per i,ooo feet, with a
provision that the price should be fixed every two years. Baird
wrote the defendant, then president -of the company, insisting that
the price should be increased. January 20, x9o2, the defendant
wrote he was making such an effort with fair prospects of success,
and that land in the vicinity was worth from $12 to $15 per acre:
January 29, and 3o , defendant wrote again giving details of negotiations, and that an increase would be obtained upon the return of
an officer of the coal company. April 8, Baird's broker wrote him
they had a purchaser at $115; he answered he would sell for $125;
on April i6, they wrote they would take it at that price; and April
ig, Baird telegraphed his acceptance, and the sale was completed
April 21, the defendant being the purchaser. On April 22, the coal
company'unexpectedly offered to buy the land at $i 5 per acre;
Hooker v. Midland Steel Co., 2is IIl. 444.
Boulden v. Stilwell, ioo Md. S43.
Baird v. Grannis, 2o8 Mo. 426.

3M
8

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

this made the shares worth $187, and the offer was accepted May
5. Upon learning this, Baird sued the defendant on the ground
that as president and general manager it was his duty to disclose
his identity as a purchaser of shares and disclose all information
as to pending negotiations likely to result in an advantageous sale
of the corporatE property, and that the defendant stood in a trust
relation to the plainiff. The court, by VAILIANT, P. J., said we do
not feel justified in deciding this point, because if the allegations
are sufficient so to charge the defendant, the proof does not sustain
thd allegations, and does not show that the defendant misrepresented
any fact or withheld any material information.
In Wann v. Scullin,3 9 (I9o8), Mrs. Wann was the owner of 5o
shares of stock in a ferry company, and was also a member of a
voting trust including a majority of the stock. Scullin was president of the company and one of the three voting trustees, of whom
Wade was another and also president of the Mercantile Trust Company in which Scullin was a large shareholder. Scullin and Francis
also weie joint owners of a railroad, which the Rock Island Railroad Company wished to buy, and did buy of Scullin and Francis
April 21, 1902, paying them in cash and 5,ooo shares each of Rock
Island stock. Later, but the same day this deal was completed,
the Rock Island company offered to buy the ferry, stock,'and to give
$5oo per share for it, if- a majority of it could be obtained. Scullin
and Wade both thought a majority could be obtained at this price,
and each offered to take that price for their own shares and to
recommend to the other shareholders to sell at the same price, but insisted that the same offer should be made to all shareholders alike.
An agreement was then made with Wade that the Mercantile Trust
Company should handle the matter for a commission of 22 per
cent, and Wade insisted that this should be stated to shareholders:
These transactions occurred in New York. Scullin and Wade
returned to St. Louis, and immediately sent letters and telegrams
to all ferry shareholders making them this. offer., saying they proposed to sell their shares at this price, 'and advising them to sell.
Up to that time the ferry stock had never brought over $250 per
share. Plaintiff immediately accepted the offer by telegram, and
sent her-stock to Scullin, who in the forenoon April 26, turned the
stock over to the Mercantile Trust Company. Near evening of
the same day, the Mississippi Valley Trust Company made an
effort to secure ferry stock for another party, and by telegrams
offered $6oo per share, and within the next few days, in the contest
t*Warm v. Scullin, -

Mo. -,

iog S. W. 688.
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between the two trust companies, the price of the stock went as
high as $1,525 per share. As soon as Mrs. Wann learned of the
contest she telegraphed Scullin and Wade to protect her interest.
They did not answer, but the Mercantile Trust Company sent her
a check for the whole amount at $5oo per share, claiming to have
purchased it at that price on April 26th.
Sometime later this
check was cashed, and plaintiff sued Scullin for violation of his
trust relation as an officer of the ferry company toward herself as
a shareholder, on the ground that he had an interest'in the trust
company and in the railroad company that made the purchase of
the ferry stock, which he did not disclose. It was held however,
that this was not a fraud in law, and the failure to disclose was
not shown to be a material inducement to the plaintiff to make the
sale; and that the defendants could not have acted more fairly,
'and could not anticipate the war between the trust companies to
secure the stock. The court reviews several cases upon the liability
of a special agent for nondisclosure to his principal.
In Von An v. Magen-heimer,40 (19O8), MILLr, J., in holding defendants, liable used language very appropriate to cases of this kind.
Here the plaintiff owned 483 of the 1,500 shares of a confectionery
company; each defendant owned a like number of shares, and were
respectively president and treasurer of the company. The plaintiff
averred that defendants conspired to obtain her stock for less than
'its worth, and in order to depress its value, make her believe it was
worth less than it was, _and induce her to sell for an inadequate
consideration they -(a) refrained from declaring a fair dividend,
and declared one of only 3 per cent; (b) increased the salaries of
each from $2,5oo to $7,500; (c) represented that the company suf-

fered such reverses that it could not then pay more than a 3 per
cent dividend, and it was doubtful if it ever could pay any more.
The proof sustained these charges and further that the company
had paid from 9 to 14 per cent dividends for several years before,
that the losses had not been unusual, and that within a month after
purchasing plaintiff's stock a io per cent dividend was declared, and
salaries reduced to $4,ooo each. The court said "While the wrong
now being considered was not technically a deceit its effect was to
defraud plaintiff, and, in respect of the remedy at least should be
treated as a fraud. It was a species of fraud; by the wrongful
acts of the defendants the plaintiff was led to think that her stock
was worth less than in fact it was, and we should not indulge in
hair-splitting discriminations between that kind of deceit and a
40Von

Au v. Magenhelimer,

126

App. Div. (N. Y.) 257.
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fraudulent misrepresentation or concealment respecting an existing
fact, in view of the relations of the parties. If their relation was
not strictly of the fiduciary character of trustee and cestui que trust,
it was in a sense fiduciary; at least the parties did not deal on equal
terms; indirectly if not actually, the defendants were the agents
or trustees of the plaintiff, for in truth the entity called the corporation but represents the stockholders; in law the two are distinct,
as the stockholders own merely their shares, not the property of the
corporation; but in fact each share represents a given interest in the
property of the corporation. While the defendants did not have
control of the plaintiff's shares, they had control of the property
represented by said shares, and their management of that property
affected the value of the shares precisely as though the corporate
property and the shares were one and the same. The defendants
were not under the disabilities of trustees in respect of dealings
with a cestui que trust, but their .superior position imposed upon
them some duty to the plaintiff as well as to the corporation, a least
the duty not to take advantage of the opporunity afforded by their
position to wrong her by any affirmative act designed to injure.
Having the power to so manage the affairs of the corporation as to
affect the value of her shares, they owed her the duty to refrain
from intentionally abusing that power actually or apparently to depress the value of those shares for the purpose of acquiring them at
an undervaluation. When they succeeded in securing her stock by
that misuse of power they committed a breach of duty to her
resulting in injury, and it is immaterial that their act may also have
wronged the corporation. In- view of the conditions under which
business is now conducted it will be very unfortunate if it shall
be held that the duty of corporate managers in respect of their
conduct of tle corporate affairs is solely to the corporate entity,
and that however great a designed injury to an individual stockholder may be, he can only get redress through the corporation.
The purpose of the wrong being to injure the plaintiff that should
be held to have been its effect." GAYNOR, J.; dissents, on the ground
there was no concealment or misstatement of any fact.
In Steinfeld v. Nielsen"' (i9o9), Steinfeld, though not an officer
of the smelting company, yet by ownership of a large part of the
stock, and having two of the three directors in the employ of a firm
of which he was the managing agent, and to which the smelting
company was largely indebted, caused the smelter to be shut down,
in order that he might get rid of plaintiff as a director and superin41 Steinfeld v. Nielsen, -

Ariz. -,

o Pac. xo94.
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tendent of the company, and purchase his stock at a low price; and
in order to do this he falsely represented to plaintiff that the indebtedness was not being 15aid, caused him to be discharged, caused a
false entry thereof to be made, and concealed the opportunity and
the purpose of purchasing adjoining mining claims at prices that
would add much to the property. DOAN, J,, said': "We have no
hesitation in holding Steinfeld, because of his power over the board
of directors and the affairs of the company, and the domination he
actually exercised over the corporation, sustained such a relation
to the company and to the stockholders as does an officer having
such management and control, and therefore occupied- such fiduciary relation as he would, had he been an officer. * * * Undoubtedly the law makes it the duty of an officer who is seeking to purchase from a stockholder the latter's holdings of stock, to disclose
to the latter facts which have come to him by virtue of his relations
to the company, and not known to the stockholder, or which may
not be readily ascertained by the stockholder, and to disclose such
plans and purposes as the corporation may have for the future
which have a bearing upon the value of the stock of the company,"
-- citing Stewart v. Harris,and Oliver v. Oliver, supra. The court,
however, by a majority, ruled that the plaintiff, Nielsen, being a
director and superintendent, was in a position to know as much of
the facts as Steinfeld, and for that reason could not recover.
KrNT, C.J., dissented on this latter point.
In Pellio v Bull's Head Coal Co. 42 (I9O9), plaintiff sold his
shares August 17, i9o6, at $i,ooo, at the solicitation of W., who was
then secretary and treasurer of the mining company. Before selling, plaintiff consulted W., as to the condition of the mine and the
value of the stock and was told the mine was about worked out and
that $300 would be a good price for his 5 shares. This was false
and misleading; the company then had over $13,ooo surplus, and in
November, 19o6, shares sold for $i8o. Within two years prior: to
the sale the president and secretary had drawn out $49,000 in unauthorized salaries. Plaintiff did not at the time of the sale know
whether W. bought for himself or for the company; the check given
in payment was signed by W. as treasurer, and the purchase was
in fact made for the company. After learning of the facts plaintiff
tendered $i,ooo and interest to the company and demanded a retransfer of the shares, and upofi refusal sued both W. and the
company. The trial court held plaintiff was entitled to a return of
his stock, and refused a decree against W. The company appealed,
42Pellio v. Bull's Head Coal Co., -

Pa. -,

73 AtI. 4S3.
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and plaintiff filed a cross appeal claiming the court in the present
case had the power to compel an accounting and repayment into the
treasury of the sums fraudulently taken by W. This was refused,
the court saying that after the plaintiff again became a shareholder
he might perhaps sue in case the com-pany refused, after demand
upon it to do so. This was affirmed per curiam by the supreme
court.
To sum up these cases upon what they say as to the existence of,
a trust relation between the director and the individual shareholder,
without special reference to the particular facts or to the necessity
of relying on such a doctrine, the following eleven cases say there is
no fiduLciary or trust relation of that kind: Smith v. Hurd," Carpentier v. Danforth," Board etc. Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds, 5
Deaderick v. Wilson,'

Gillette v. Bowen," Crowell v. Jackson,'8

Krumbhaat v. Grifltth, Percival v. Wright,0 Walsh v. Goulden,51
O'Neile v. Ternes,5 2" Hooker v. Midland Steel Co." Such an expression occurs in some other cases, but apparently only incidentally,
and without any bearing upon the facts involved. The following
five cases say there is a trust or fiduciary relation so existing:
1
Von
-disham v. Stainton,51 Oliver v. Oliver, 5 Stewart v. Harris,6
Au v. Magenheimer," Steinfeld v. Nielson,5" while Perry v. Pearson,1. held that "if it be admitted" it was not violated, Baird v. Grannis,60 refused to pass on it, and Strong v. Repide1 admitted that
special facts may create such a trust relation.
With reference to the facts involved in the cases reviewed above
they 'may be grouped as follows: Those in which
(i) Misrepresentation of a material fact was. made by the
purchasing officer directly to the selling shareholder, as in Fishe
9

Met. (Mais.) 371 (1847).
Barb. (N. Y.)
8sz, (1868).
Ind. sog (1873).
Tenn. (8 Bax.) zo8, (x874.)
4T2 3 Fed. R. 62S (188S).
53 N. J. L. (24 Vroom.) 6S6 (z8gz).
z52
"Sz
.44
"67

4

zsi Pa. St. 223 (1892).

GOL,.P- [1902] 2 Ch. 42t.
-5130 Mich. S35 (zgo2).
'32 Wash. 528 (1903).
32,s IlL 444 (190S).
" i De Gex, J. & S. 678, 66 ] ng. Ch. 5S7, (5863).
w zz8 Ga. 362 (903).
w 69 Kans. 498 (1904).

1526
1z00
13S
002o8

App. Div. (N. Y.) 257 (190S).
Pac. 1094 (Ariz. sgog).
IlL. 218 (zS8go).
'Mo. 426 (zso7).
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v. Budlong, 62 Hume v. Steele, 3 Morrison v. Snow," and Pellio v.
0
'
These do not depend upon, and yet are
Bulls Head Coal Co.
any trust or confidential relation existing
with,
not inconsistent
between corporate officers and individual shareholders.
(2)
False reports either by false statements of facts, or partial
and incomplete statements intentionally made to .the corporation or
to the public, upon which the injured party has relied, as Walsham
8
v. Stainton,6 Oliver v. Oliver,6 7and Stewart v. Harris." Likewise
these cases are neither dependent upon nor inconsistent with fiduciary
The same principle
relations between officer and shareholder.
extends however to those wio sell shares to other parties as in
0
Rothmiller v. Stein,69 or purchase shares, as in Prewitt v. Trimble
1
and Gerner v. Mosher' (not reviewed above) in reliance on false
statements made by the officers to such seller or purchaser, even
though the officer may not know at the time that his statement
is false..
(3) False statements of fact designed to induce action were
72
made, but which were not relied on, O'Neile v. Ternes; or the
party relied upon his own independent investigation, Percival v.
Wright,' Hooker v. Midland Steel Co.;'4 or had equal knowledge,
Brown v. DeYoung,75 Rafferty v. Donnelly;76or there was equal
opportunity to know, Steinfeld v. Neilson;f'or the representations
made did not relate to an existing fact, but only to a future continThese cases in
gency, Grant v.Attrill' 8 Boulden v. Stilwell."9
holding there is no liability, apply the ordinary rules relating to
fraud. Von Au v. MagenJeimer,10 however, goes further and holds
that misrepresentation of a future contingency by the corporate
officer, to the shareholder inducing him to sell his shares to the
1. S2S (1873).
S. W. 81z (Tem. Civ. App.
"26 Utah 247 (1903).
199o).
6"73 AtL 451 (Pa. e2o1
59

-

zgoo).

De Gex, J. & S.678, 66 Eng. Ch.
7 11 8 Ga. 36z (z9o3).

46 1

"69 Kans. 498 (1904)" 143 N. Y. 58x (1894).
7092 Ky. 176 (x89;).
7158 Neb. '35, 46 L,. R. A. 244 (x899).
232 Wash. 528 (1903).
1 L. R. [1902] 2 Ch. 421.
' 25 IlL 444 (19o5)..
12z67 Ill. S49 (897).
76 197 Pa. St. 423 (19o0).
tioo Pac. 1094 (Ariz. z9o9).
3 11 Fed. R. 469 (x882).
9 ioo Md. 543 (19o5).
60 126 App. Div. 257, (N. Y. 19o8).
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(x863).
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officer, is actionable because of the trust relation. There were other
material defaults in this case.
(4) Full disclosure of all the material facts then known to the
corporate officer affecting or likely to affect the value of the shares
at the time of the purchase was made, as in Carpenterv. Danforth,81
3
Krumbhaar v. Griffith$82 and Baird v. Grannis2.
Here there is no
liability, whether a trust relation exists or not:
(5) The purchasing officer has been made the special agent of
the shareholder to sell the shares, as in Fisher v. Budlong,8 ' Mulvane v. O'Brien,5 Walsh v. Gouddel, 86 Oliver v. Oliver,7 and Wann
v. Scullin."8 Here of course the special agency creates a fiduciary
relation; but it was held not to be violated in the last two cases.
(6) There was fraudulent misappropriation of corporate funds
by corporate officers, with concealment of this fact, in order to
depress the value of the shares for the purpose of purchasing them
at less than their value, as in Walsham v. Stainton,89 Ritchie v.
McMullen, 0 Brown v. DeYoung,9 ' Rafferty v. Donnelly,92 Von Au
v. Magepheimer,93 and Pellio v. Bull's Head Coal Co.9' In the
Walsham, Ritchie, and Brown cases, although the primary injury
had been (lone to the corporation, it was held the shareholder had an
action for the direct.injury done him, although in the first case there
had been a partial recovery by the corporation. In the Rafferty and
Pellio cases this point is not made very clear, but seems to indicate
there is a liability directly to the selling shareholder, and the Von. Au
case so holds, basing it upon the fiduciary relation of the purchasing
officer to the selling shareholder. This view is inconsistent with
Wells v. Dane,95 and Ninnenwn v. Fox99 (not reviewed above),holding that the right of action if any, when the injury is to the corporation, and is such as to impair the value of the shares, passes to
81s2
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'0 79 Fed. 522 (1897).
92167 Ill.549 (z897).
2 197 Pa. St. 423 (goo).
9326 App. Div. 257 (9o8).
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the transferee,--unless a different rule is to be applied when the
purchaser is the wrongdoing officer.
(7) There was concealment,--(a) active, by misleading reports or statements, as in the Walsham, Oliver, and Stewart cases
above, holding there is a liability. (b) passive, silence merely:
I. As to existing conditions or future prospects of the company,
as in Tippecanoe County v. Reynolds,0 7 Deaderick v. Wilson,9 "
Crowell v. Jackson,"0 Haarstick v. Fox,00 all holding there was no
liability for such non disclosure. 2. As to a completed or pending
profitable sale of all the property, as inTippqcanoe County v. Reynolds,101 Cros'ell v. Jackson.,102 Krumbhaar v. Griffliths,110 Perciva? v.
Wright,'0 4 Hooker v. Midland Steel Co.,' 05 all holding there is no
fiduciary relation requiring disclosure. In Mulvane v. O'Brien,00
and Oliver v. Oliver,0 7 where the sale of the property was completed at a-better price than had been proposed, and this fact was
concealed, there was a liability to account to the shareholder for
the extra price received so far as wrongfully appropriated by the
officer, but not, so far as appropriated to the payment of existing
corporate debts, as in 'Walsh v. Goulden,"8 3. 'As to the existence
of conflicting interests, Wamm v. Scullen 0 9 or an independent collateral agreementWalsh v. Goulden,"10 neither of which operated
to the injury of the selling shareholder,--in such cases there was
no liability for not disclosing such interest. 4. As to the identity
of the purchasing officer,--Strong v. Repide" is the only case that
seems to consider this of much importance, although it is referred
to in Carpenterv. Danforth,"'- Fisher v. Budlong,"' Krumbhaar v.
0
Griffiths, 14 Rafferty v. Donnelly" 5 and Baird v. Grannis."
44 Ind. 509 (1873).

967 Tenn. 8 (Bax.) xo8 (874).
w S3 N. J. I,.(24 Vroom.) 656 (i8gi).
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From this review, there is a liability for actual fraud; for the
abuse of the confidence of a special agency; for fraudulent acts
affecting the value of the shares, concealing this for the purpose
of purchasing at the depressed value, or for active or intentional
17
concealment as some of the cases say, but not for mere silence
or passive concealment, and there is no presumption of fraud, or
duty to disclose, arising out of the relation alone of director and
shareholder.
In Strong v. Repide the court held there was such a combination
of facts as raised a duty to speak,-the dominating power of the
defendant in making the sale of all the property, and his concealment of his identity as a purchaser and of the progress of the negotiations relating to the sale of the land. His dominating power
was exercised for the benefit of the company, and not to depress
the value of the shares as in the Walsham and other cases in No. 6
of the summary above. It seems to be then in the last analysis
only a case of concealment of material facts,--his own identity
as a purchaser and the real value of the property; as to the latter
it seems the defendant was only passively silent, but as to the
first he took steps to conceal, and this perhaps is sufficient to bring
it within the rules laid down in other cases.
The rule in Smith v. Hurd,,18 on which the foregoing doctrine
of the non-existence of a trust relation between the corporate officer
and individual shareholders, has grown up, had to be modified
or limited almost immediately afterward, by recognizing that the
shareholder was the real party in interest, ana in order to prevent
a failure of justice, must be allowed to sue in equity where the
corporation refuses to protect his interest after demand to do so
is made." 9 Mr. Pomeroy 120 found it necessary to call the directors quasi trustees for individual shareholders, and admirably classified the cases into four classes: (i) Where parties are induced
to purchase shares by fraudulent statements or concealments in
a prospectus or report, the individual shareholder has an action;
(2) Ultra vires transactions,--individual shareholders can sue for
their own damage; (3) Wrongful dealing with the corporate
property,-.-the corporation has the primary right to sue,-but (4),
Carpenter v. Danforth, Crowley v. Jackson, Haarstick v. Fox, Von Au v. Magen-.
1Tr
heiner, supra.
rn Met. (Mass.) 37x (847).
"a Dodge v. Woolsey, 18 How. 331 (x8$5), Howes v. Oakland, 104 U. S. 450
(x88).
"', quity if io88-o96.
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if it cannot or will not upon proper demand, the shareholder may
sue in a representative capa'city for the benefit of all.
It is usual to argue that to extend the rule further than to make
a liability for active concealment, and to make a duty of disclosure
by the officer to the shareholder before purchasing his shares, would
deprive a director of the valuable right to purchase shares in open
market that other shareholders have, lessen the market for shares,
require constant information to be given whenever the shareholder
wishes to buy as well as sell, and of losses as well as gains, and place
various other imaginary hardships upon the director.
Such considerations do not appeal to the writer as formidable.
That the director may take advantage of his position to secure the
profits that all have won, offends the moral sense; no shareholder
expects to be so treated by the director he selects; no director
would urge his friends to select him for that reason; that the law
yet allows him to do this, does more to discouiage legitimate investment in corporate shares than almost anything else, and allows
the fiction of the corporate entity to obstruct instead of advance
justice. Would it not be well to go back to the original theory
of Walshanm v. Stainton, followed by several later cases and ably
contended for by Judge JOHNSON in the Philippine Supreme Court?
The writer believes it would.
H. L. WILGUS.
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